This Blog article is summarized and polished by AI from my English presentation for Worldwide Independence Lawyers League(WILL) Italy’s 2025 Rome event.

本文原先是英文報告於國際獨立律師聯盟義大利分會2025年羅馬會議，後由AI整理潤飾與翻譯。

English summary

1. Introduction of the digital challenges for the traditional international tax rules

This event covers a powerful mix of topics: digital taxes, criminal investigations, and trade disputes. It’s not just about collecting taxes—it’s about how law, tech, and global trade all connect.

In Europe, countries like France and Italy take digital tax enforcement seriously. I’ll share two real examples to show how tough they are on tax evasion.

I’ll also talk about Taiwan’s digital tax policy. While Taiwan does tax foreign digital services, the focus is mostly on collecting revenue, not on deeper legal or global trade concerns. But when digital taxes hit foreign companies, they can lead to trade tensions.

Digital trade is very different from physical trade—you don’t need materials or factories. Once a digital product or service is made, it can be delivered anywhere at almost no extra cost, which makes it harder to regulate.

At the same time, digital trade reflects a country’s tech power and competitiveness. So how we regulate it isn’t just about money—it’s also about strategy.

2. A brief on EU Digital Service Tax

To start, I’ll walk through the EU’s digital tax timeline. The conversation began in 2017, and by March 2018, the EU proposed its first plan to tax the digital economy fairly—laying the foundation for today’s system.

The EU’s original digital services tax proposal was simple: a 3% tax on digital companies’ revenue, not profits. It looked like a VAT, but it wasn’t. And it didn’t follow the usual corporate tax rules, which are based on net income.
This raised some legal concerns, because calling it a corporate tax—even though it’s based on sales, not profits—doesn’t match standard tax definitions.The proposal entered the EU’s complex legislative process: it had to pass the European Parliament, and then be approved by each member state’s parliament, which slowed things down.

In 2019, France became the first country to launch its own digital services tax, targeting: 1.Online streaming platforms like Netflix, and 2. Online ads on platforms like Meta and Google.

Soon after, Austria and Italy followed, and by mid-2020, Poland, Spain, and Portugal joined in.

A key turning point came in October 2021, when several countries with DSTs released a joint statement. They said their taxes were temporary, and once a global solution—like the OECD’s Pillar One—was in place, they would withdraw their own rules and switch to the new system.

The shift toward digital taxation was driven in part by global talks under the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework, especially after the Biden administration brought new energy to the discussions.

Another key step was the EU’s DAC7 Directive, which improves tax transparency by requiring digital platforms to share user data with tax authorities. This helps close loopholes, especially in business models like Airbnb, where income often goes unreported.

Several EU countries, including Austria, Denmark, France, and Hungary, have DST rates ranging from 0% to 7.5%. Some paused enforcement as a goodwill gesture to the U.S.—but Italy still fully applies a 3% DST, one of the clearest examples in Europe.

After the pandemic, digital services exploded—from streaming to e-commerce—becoming the “new normal.” Governments, facing budget deficits, saw digital taxes as a way to collect revenue from fast-growing global tech firms.

The UK plays a unique role here. It may become the first country to sign a digital trade agreement with the U.S., shaping the future of digital tax and trade policy.

3. Criminal Investigation on Netflix in Italy and France

Now let’s look at Italy’s case against Netflix. Netflix offered services in Italy for years without a physical office. But in 2020, Italian prosecutors reached a €55.8 million settlement for taxes owed between 2015–2019, arguing that Netflix’s use of local servers and infrastructure amounted to a digital presence.

After the settlement, Netflix opened a Rome office with 40 staff, and now pays VAT and corporate tax like a local company.

This success inspired France, which—with Dutch cooperation—launched a similar investigation into Netflix’s revenue shifting to the Netherlands. That case is still ongoing, but a settlement is expected soon.

Other tech giants have faced similar action. Google, for example, settled for €300 million in 2017 and paid another €325 million in back taxes for 2015–2019.

These cases show that when tax authorities are firm and strategic, they can challenge the “no presence, no tax” model and secure major settlements. They also set a strong precedent for other countries seeking to protect their tax rights in the digital age.

4. US trade invesitigation on EU DST

These tech companies represent more than business—they symbolize U.S. tech power. So when they feel unfairly taxed, they can ask the U.S. Trade Representative to launch a Section 301 investigation.

That’s exactly what happened under the Trump administration in 2019, starting with France and Italy, and later including Austria, Spain, and the U.K. The U.S. claimed these countries’ digital taxes were:

Discriminatory toward U.S. tech firms,
Based on revenue, not profit, and
Violated international trade rules.

In response, Trump proposed 25% tariffs on $1.3 billion of French luxury goods—especially cosmetics and red wine.

When Biden took office, the tariffs were paused to give space for global tax talks under the OECD/G20’s Pillar One and Pillar Two.

But this peace is fragile. Trump has already vowed to withdraw from Pillar Two and return to unilateral trade action, including tariffs and new 301 probes.

A good example is the U.S.–U.K. digital tax issue. The U.K. has a DST, but both countries agreed to delay conflict and revisit the matter later—possibly after other trade issues are settled.

5. Taiwan’s quasi-Digital Service Tax

Now let’s look at Taiwan’s approach. Taiwan doesn’t have a formal digital services tax, but it uses two tools to tax foreign digital businesses:

VAT: Foreign e-commerce platforms must register and pay VAT if annual sales to Taiwan exceed €16,000—a very low threshold.
Corporate Income Tax: Although not passed as law, Taiwan’s Ministry of Finance applies CIT based on a 30% estimated profit margin, taxed at 20%, which results in:
- 6% of sales if local contribution is 100% (as Meta chose), or
- 3% if it’s 50%.

This system is similar to the EU DST, but it’s based on administrative guidance, not legislation—raising concerns about legality and transparency. Key differences from the EU:

Taiwan’s low threshold makes it harder to argue it discriminates against U.S. firms.
It blends VAT, CIT, and DST concepts, creating legal uncertainty.

6. Future Outlook

Trump has returned to office, we may see renewed pressure on countries that tax U.S. tech firms, possibly reviving digital trade conflicts by late 2025 or early 2026.

This ties into a bigger issue: how we define Permanent Establishment (PE). Traditionally, a company pays tax in a country only if it has a physical presence—like an office or factory.

But digital giants operate without one, making it harder for countries to tax them. Italy, for example, argued that Netflix’s use of local infrastructure created a functional presence, even without an office.

This debate is even more relevant in the AI era. At Computex Taiwan, NVIDIA’s CEO Jensen Huang explained that AI businesses now run on data centers, producing virtual tokens that act as digital products.

If these tokens become common, the location of the data center—not just offices—could define where taxes are owed. This would be an “alternative PE” model, where data = value = tax base.

We’re moving toward a second big shift in international tax rules. And it may happen in the next 2 to 5 years.

報告的中文摘要

一、數位挑戰對傳統國際稅制的衝擊

本次活動涵蓋了多項重要議題：數位稅、刑事調查與貿易爭端。這不只是單純的稅收問題，更是法律、科技與全球貿易之間如何交互作用的重要展現。

在歐洲，像法國和義大利這些國家對數位稅的執行非常嚴格。我將分享兩個真實案例，來說明他們在打擊逃稅方面有多強硬。

我也會談到台灣的數位稅政策。台灣雖然有對外國數位服務課稅，但重點多在於稅收的徵集，較少觸及更深層的法律面或全球貿易的考量。然而，當數位稅波及到外國企業時，往往會引發貿易緊張。

數位貿易與實體貿易截然不同——它不需要原料或工廠。一旦數位產品或服務完成，就能以幾乎零成本傳送到世界各地，這也使得監管更加困難。

與此同時，數位貿易也展現了一個國家的科技實力與競爭力。因此，對其進行規範不僅關乎稅收，更是一項國家戰略。

二、歐盟數位服務稅簡介

首先，我將簡要介紹歐盟數位稅的發展時程。這場討論始於 2017 年，而在 2018 年 3 月，歐盟提出第一項針對數位經濟公平課稅的方案，為今日的制度奠定基礎。

歐盟最初的數位服務稅（DST）提案設計簡單：對數位企業的「營收」課徵 3% 稅率，而非「利潤」。看起來類似加值型營業稅（VAT），但實際上並不是，且未遵循傳統以淨利為基礎的公司稅規則。

這也引發了一些法律上的疑慮，因為雖然名為「公司稅」，但卻以銷售額為課稅基礎，這與國際通行的稅制定義不符。

該提案進入歐盟的立法程序，需先經歐洲議會通過，再逐一獲得所有會員國國會批准，導致進程緩慢。

2019 年，法國成為首個實施本國版數位服務稅的國家，主要針對：

線上影音平台（如 Netflix），
線上廣告平台（如 Meta 和 Google）。

隨後，奧地利與義大利也緊跟其後，至 2020 年中，波蘭、西班牙與葡萄牙等國也加入課徵行列。

一個重要的轉折點出現在 2021 年 10 月，數個實施 DST 的國家發表聯合聲明，表示其稅制為「暫時性措施」，一旦有全球性解方（如 OECD 的「第一支柱」Pillar One）正式上路，便會撤回各自法規，轉而採納新制度。

數位稅的推動，部分來自 OECD/G20 包容性框架下的全球協商，特別是在拜登政府上任後為相關討論注入新的活力。

另一項關鍵進展是歐盟的 DAC7 指令，它強化了稅務透明度，要求數位平台與稅務機關分享用戶資料，特別針對像 Airbnb 這類常有所得未申報的商業模式，有助於填補稅制漏洞。

目前歐盟多國，包括奧地利、丹麥、法國與匈牙利的 DST 稅率介於 0% 至 7.5%。其中有些國家為了對美示好而暫緩執行，但義大利仍完整執行 3% 的 DST，堪稱歐洲最明確的案例之一。

疫情之後，數位服務快速擴張——從串流媒體到電子商務，成為「新常態」。各國政府面對財政赤字，開始將數位稅視為向快速成長的全球科技巨頭徵收稅收的途徑。

英國在這場稅制發展中扮演了特殊角色。它可能成為第一個與美國簽署數位貿易協議的國家，對未來的數位稅制與數位貿易政策具有關鍵影響力。

三、Netflix 在義大利與法國的刑事稅務調查

接下來我們來看 Netflix 在義大利的案件。多年來，Netflix 雖在義大利提供服務，但並未設立實體辦公室。然而在 2020 年，義大利檢察官主張 Netflix 使用當地伺服器與網路基礎設施，已構成「數位常設機構」，因此應繳納公司稅與增值稅。最終雙方達成和解，Netflix 補繳 2015 至 2019 年間稅款，共計 5,580 萬歐元。

達成和解後，Netflix 在羅馬成立辦公室，聘用 40 名員工，並開始依照本地企業繳納增值稅與公司稅。

這項成功案例也啟發了法國政府。法國與荷蘭合作，對 Netflix 將收入轉移至荷蘭的行為展開類似調查。該案仍在進行中，但預計將很快達成和解。

其他科技巨頭也面臨類似情況。例如 Google 在 2017 年與義大利達成 3 億歐元的和解，並補繳 2015 至 2019 年間的稅款共 3.25 億歐元。

這些案例顯示，當稅務機關立場堅定、策略明確時，便能有效挑戰「無實體＝免稅」的模式，並取得大筆補稅和解金。同時也為其他國家在數位時代捍衛稅收主權立下了重要先例。

四、美國對歐盟數位服務稅的貿易調查

這些科技公司不僅僅是企業，更是美國科技實力的象徵。因此，當它們認為自己遭到不公平課稅時，便可能要求美國貿易代表署（USTR）啟動《貿易法》第301條調查（Section 301 investigation）。

這正是川普政府在2019年所做的事情，首先針對法國與義大利，之後又納入奧地利、西班牙與英國。美方主張這些國家的數位稅：

對美國科技公司具有歧視性，
以營收為課稅基礎而非利潤，
違反國際貿易規範。

作為回應，川普政府曾提議對價值13億美元的法國奢侈品（特別是化妝品與紅酒）加徵25%的報復性關稅。

拜登上任後，為了給 OECD/G20 共同框架下的國際稅制談判留出空間，這些關稅暫時被擱置，期待透過「第一支柱」與「第二支柱」（Pillar One and Pillar Two）達成全球解決方案。

然而，這場和平極為脆弱。川普已表態若重新執政，將退出「第二支柱」，並恢復單邊貿易行動，包括新一輪的關稅與301調查。

一個典型例子是美國與英國之間的數位稅爭議。英國目前施行數位服務稅，但雙方已協議暫時擱置爭端，待其他貿易議題處理完畢後再行討論，顯示數位稅議題仍可能再次成為貿易衝突的引爆點。

五、台灣的準數位服務稅制度

接下來看看台灣的作法。台灣目前尚未正式立法實施數位服務稅（DST），但透過兩項制度對外國數位企業進行課稅：

加值型營業稅（VAT）：若外國電商平台每年對台灣銷售額超過 €16,000（約新台幣50萬元），即需辦理稅籍登記並繳納5%營業稅。此門檻相當低。
營利事業所得稅（CIT）：雖未有明確法律規定，台灣財政部根據「推定利潤率」課稅，假設利潤率為30%，以20%的公司稅率計算，實質等同於：
- 若本地貢獻佔100%（如 Meta 所選擇），課稅比例為 6%* 銷售額；
- 若本地貢獻僅50%，則為 3% *銷售額。

這樣的制度與歐盟 DST 相似，但依據的是行政指導而非正式立法，因而引發關於其合法性與透明度的疑慮。

與歐盟制度的主要差異包括：

台灣的低門檻使其較不易被指控為針對美國企業的歧視性措施；
台灣將 VAT、CIT 和 DST 的概念混合運用，造成法律適用上的不確定性。

六、未來展望

川普再次執政後，預期將對課徵美國科技公司稅負的國家施加更大壓力，數位貿易衝突可能在 2025 年底至 2026 年初再次升溫。

這也牽涉到一個更大的議題：常設機構（PE）的定義。傳統上，公司只有在某國設有實體存在（如辦公室、工廠）時才需納稅。

但數位巨頭往往不需設立實體據點，造成各國在課稅上的困難。例如義大利曾主張，Netflix 雖無辦公室，但因使用當地網路基礎設施，已構成「功能性存在（functional presence）」，應視同 PE。

在 AI 時代，這個問題更顯重要。NVIDIA 執行長黃仁勳在台灣 Computex 展中指出，AI 企業的運作仰賴資料中心，而這些中心產出的虛擬代幣（tokens）即為新的數位產品。

若這類代幣成為主流，未來課稅的依據將可能從「是否有實體辦公室」轉向「資料中心的所在地」，形成所謂「替代型 PE 模型」——資料 = 價值 = 課稅基礎。

我們正朝向第二次國際稅制大變革邁進，這可能會在未來 2 至 5 年內實現。

Digital Taxation, Criminal Investigation and Trade Conflict – Presentation for WILL ITALY on 2025/5/22(數位課稅、刑案調查與貿易衝突-報告於國際獨立律師聯盟義大利分會)